






THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES  
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 
In The Future of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Professors Lisa 
Crooms and Dawinder Sidhu discuss the potential for expanding the 
mandate of the Commission.  Professor Crooms opens by noting that 
suggestions to expand the Commission’s mandate to include human 
rights have been around for decades, and argues that such ideas are 
still worth adopting.  She comments that the Commission would have 
to engage in extensive fact-finding in order to justify such an 
expansion.  Professor Crooms raises further concerns over 
manipulation of the appointment process for commissioners, but that 
such manipulation has not necessarily jeopardized the Commission’s 
role.  Indeed, she concludes that an expansion of the mandate to 
include human rights would aid the United States in meeting its treaty 
obligations and discourage the Commission from ignoring its vital 
role in responding to important equality issues, including those 
already within its core mandate. 
Professor Sidhu argues that the Commission's current civil rights 
mandate is too valuable to be expanded because persistent and 
complex traditional civil rights issues require its determined focus.  
Ultimately, he writes, the question is how to make the Commission 
more effective in meeting its existing obligations.  Rather than 
expanding its mandate to include broad human rights oversight, which 
would dilute the Commission's existing duties, Sidhu contends that the 
Commission and civil rights compliance more generally would stand to 
benefit from a reinterpretation of its civil rights mandate, which may 
generate renewed public and government support for the Commission's 
work.  Sidhu concludes that human rights monitoring may be best 
assumed by a separate federal independent agency. 
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The United States Commission on Civil Rights has been criticized 
with little regard for political fealty.  It may indeed be the proverbial 
needle in the haystack of partisan politics.  The universality of the 
belief that the Commission is broken, however, belies the widely 
divergent views about how it got that way and what to do about it.  
Some contend “the Commission has outlived its usefulness” because 
the discrimination and inequality at the center of its mandate are 
history.  Ben Smith, A Conservative Dismisses Right-Wing Black Panther 
“Fantasies,” POLITICO, July 16, 2010, http://dyn.politico.com/ 
printstory.cfm?uuid=DD3055BF-18FE-70B2-A836F25EC61EF57A (quoting 
Linda Chavez, president of the Center for Equal Opportunity).  
Others claim the Commission is hampered by a double standard that 
not only fails to take black racism seriously, but also supports the kinds 
of preferential programs and policies the Supreme Court rejects.  
Letter from Gerald A. Reynolds, Chairman, U.S. Comm’n on Civil 
Rights, to Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen. (Oct. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.usccr.gov/NBPH/10-13-10_Ltr2Holder-Perez.pdf.  Still 
others believe partisan maneuvering has stacked the Commission with 
ideologues hostile to the agency’s equality and nondiscrimination 
mandate, seriously compromising the Commission’s ability to do its 
work.  GARRINE P. LANEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34699 THE U.S. 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS:  HISTORY, FUNDING AND CURRENT 
ISSUES 17-20 (2008). 
 
There is a certain amount of truth in all three views.  The circa 
1957 racism at which the Commission first took aim has changed.  
Created only three years after Brown v. Board of Education, the 
Commission fixed its crosshairs on Jim Crow and de jure racial 
segregation.  In 2010, de facto racial discrimination persists, rendered 
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all but unreachable by the outdated notions of intent associated with 
its de jure counterpart.  Without demonstrable intent, discrimination 
is beyond the law, set there by Supreme Court decisions based on false 
notions of racial equality.  These are the cases that offer views of 
equality and nondiscrimination untethered from the racially specific 
history of the amendments on which much of modern civil rights law 
is based.  This world is color-blind.  Here, racism and racial 
discrimination are equal opportunity offenses.  In the context of the 
Commission, this is exacerbated by those who are willing to play fast 
and loose with the rules governing the appointment of commissioners 
and the Commission’s composition.  The Commission has come to be 
dominated by a conservative majority in which Republicans and 
Independents are virtually indistinguishable. 
While some might conclude that the best way to fix the 
Commission is to kill it, I disagree.  Rather, expanding the 
Commission’s mandate could go a long way towards refocusing its 
efforts on the independent monitoring of the government’s civil 
rights record that marked the highpoint of the Commission’s history.  
Adding ratified human rights treaties to the body of law with which 
the Commission is concerned will better enable the United States to 
meet its treaty obligations.  In this situation, more rather than less 
might be warranted. 
Expanding the Commission’s focus to reach human rights was 
first proposed in the early 1970s by Notre Dame University President 
and charter member of the Commission, Father Theodore M. 
Hesburgh.  Theodore M. Hesburgh, The Commission on Civil Rights—
And Human Rights, 34 REV. OF POL. 291, 303-04 (1972).  Since then, 
Father Hesburgh’s idea has been reprised by others both within and 
outside the Commission.  MARY FRANCES BERRY, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL 
175, 338 (2009).  Recently, the call to expand the Commission’s 
mandate in this way has been taken up by social justice, civil rights, 
and human rights organizations that believe this shift would restore 
luster to the Commission’s reputation as “the conscience of the 
nation.”  The Law of the Land:  U.S. Implementation of Human Rights 
Treaties: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights & the Law and the 
S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Wade 
Henderson, President & CEO, The Leadership Conference on Civil 
and Human Rights); see also Lisa A. Crooms, Bringing Human Rights 
Home to Help People Who Need Help the Most, ROLL CALL, Dec. 11, 2009, 
http://www.rollcall.com/news/41435-1.html; Catherine Powell, 
Human Rights at Home:  A Domestic Policy Blueprint for the New 
Administration AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, 4-5 (Oct. 30 2008), 
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http://www.acslaw.org/files/C%20Powell%20Blueprint.pdf. 
To be sure, the vision of human rights on which this proposed 
expansion is based would probably resolve the Commission’s current 
ideological disputes in favor of those who believe that “[a]t the heart 
of the civil rights movements is the basic human dignity of all people and 
their right to live in freedom with justice and equal opportunity.”  
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION FUND, RESTORING 
THE CONSCIENCE OF A NATION: A REPORT ON THE U.S. COMMISSION ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS 44 (2009), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/ 
reports/commission/lccref_commission_report_march2009.pdf.  At a 
minimum, however, this expansion would require the Commission to 
engage in the kind of fact-finding on which its early reputation was 
built and which was essential to making the case for laws such as the 
Civil Rights Act of 1965, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968.  It would shift the Commission’s focus from false 
issues such as the investigation of voterless claims of voter intimidation 
in the interest of taking black racism seriously.  Adam Serwer, Do We Need 
a Commission on Civil Rights?, AMERICAN PROSPECT, July 21, 2010, 
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=do_we_need_a_commissi
on_on_civil_rights.  It could decrease the ability of the Commission to 
absent itself from serious human rights events such as Hurricane 
Katrina and its aftermath, police murders in cities such as Oakland, 
California, and the racially motivated abuse of the criminal justice system 
in Jena, Louisiana.  Id.  These are among the things that could change by 
expanding the Commission’s mandate to include human rights. 
This is not meant to suggest there would be no room for debate 
among the Commissioners.  Diversity of opinion is necessary for the 
kind of robust discourse that allowed the Commission to play an 
important role in the civil rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.  
Even in those halcyon days, the Commission’s independence was 
threatened by those on whom the Commission cast an unflattering 
light.  Despite these tensions, politics did not seriously deter the 
Commission from performing its essential functions and gathering the 
empirical data that demonstrated the need for major civil rights 
legislation.  In 1983, this changed when the appointment rules were 
altered.  New rules meant Commissioners were no longer chosen by 
the President with the bipartisanship that receiving advice and 
consent from the Senate requires.  Interbranch responsibility would 
be shared in a different way, with four Commissioners appointed by 
the President, and two each by the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House.  These congressional 
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appointments need only be informed by recommendations from the 
leaders of the majority and minority parties.  Laney, supra, at 6-7, 17-18.  
They do not require any real bipartisanship. 
The danger posed by these rules is the politically motivated 
manipulation of the appointments process they have been interpreted 
to permit.  Over the past ten years, Republicans have been able to 
avoid the “no more than four” rule by appointing Independents 
rather than Democrats.  These Commissioners appear to be 
Independent in name only and, more often than not, take positions 
that make them indistinguishable from their Republican 
counterparts.  Perhaps the most egregious example of this type of 
political maneuvering involves Vice-Chairperson Abigail Thernstrom, 
who has, since 2001, changed her political affiliation twice.  With each 
change, Thernstrom created an opening filled by a conservative with 
the needed party affiliation to avoid running afoul of the appointment 
rules.  With the exception of Thernstrom herself, most of the 
Commissioners appointed in this way lack any appreciable civil rights 
expertise beyond opposing affirmative action.  Serwer, supra.  
Satisfying the letter of the appointments rules at the expense of their 
spirit has prevented the Commission from constructively contributing 
to civil rights discourse and has compromised its efforts to monitor 
government implementation and enforcement of civil rights laws. 
The likelihood that adding human rights to the Commission’s 
mandate could help to overcome these difficulties increases if the 
Commission is constituted in accord with the Paris Principles.  United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/134 sets forth “[p]rinciples 
relating to the status of national [human rights] institutions,” 
according to which Commission membership and composition would 
be determined by “a procedure which affords all necessary guarantees 
to ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of civilian 
society) involved in the protection and promotion of human rights, 
particularly by powers which will enable effective cooperation.”  Paris 
Principles, G.A. Res. 48/134, at 4-5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134 (Mar. 
4, 1994).  This standard is at odds with the manipulation of the 
appointments rules that has facilitated the current conservative 
majority—for which any distinction between Republicans and 
Independents is largely one of name rather than substance. 
Transforming the Commission into a national human rights 
institution can also help the United States meet its obligations under 
the human rights treaties it has ratified.  Beginning in the 1990s, no 
fewer than three United Nations’ human rights treaty bodies have 
expressed concern about the absence of a national, independent 
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human rights institution.  Previous administrations chose either to 
ignore these concerns or deflect them with broad pronouncements 
about the limits of federalism and the primacy of the states.  Most 
recently, however, the call for an independent human rights 
institution was met with assurances from the Obama Administration 
that creating such an institution was “currently under consideration in 
the United States.”  Human Rights Council, Draft Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review: United States of America, ¶ 29, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/9/L.9 (Nov. 10, 2010).  There are a number of 
different forms that national, independent human rights institutions 
can take, including the form that would be created by transforming 
the Commission into such an institution.  While the ultimate outcome 
of this consideration is unknown, what is fairly certain is that other 
assurances to ratify signed treaties—such as the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women—will make the need for a national human rights institution 
more urgent.  The Administration’s commitment to leading by 
example in matters of human rights makes the need for such an 
institution more, rather than less, pressing. 
Finally, expanding the Commission’s mandate to include human 
rights would permit it to fill a gap in the agency’s jurisdiction, thereby 
strengthening its work.  The Paris Principles require that national 
human rights institutions “be given as broad a mandate as possible, 
which shall be clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative text, 
specifying its composition and its sphere of competence.”  Paris 
Principles, supra, at 4.  Addressing discrimination based on statuses 
such as sexual orientation, gender identity, and poverty “could make 
clear a concern with the nexus between race, sex, disability, age, 
national origin, sexual orientation, religious discrimination, poverty, 
and civil liberties concerns.”  BERRY, supra, at 338.  This is the type of 
broad mandate that the Paris Principles require.  It involves the kind 
of expansion with which the Commission is familiar, having added 
discrimination on the basis of age, sex, and disability to its original 
four areas of concern:  race, color, religion, and national origin.  The 
Commission’s own history attests to its ability to address more without 
losing sight of its core issues and concerns.  Recent events 
demonstrate that the unfinished business of racial justice and equality 
has not been lost in the larger universe of interdependent human 
rights.  Concerns about the effect of race and racial discrimination on 
basic human rights remain central to any comprehensive evaluation of 
the United States’s human rights record.  As long as civil rights are 
2010] The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 133 
understood as part of the broader human rights framework, there is 
nothing to indicate that broadening the Commission’s mandate will 
yield a human rights agenda in which the continuing need to remedy 
racial discrimination will be either eclipsed or forgotten. 
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REBUTTAL 
On Reframing, Not Expanding, the Commission’s Mandate 
Dawinder S. Sidhu†
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is an independent federal 
agency responsible for (1) investigating deprivations of the right to 
vote resulting from discrimination or fraud; (2) examining and 
apprising laws related to discrimination or the denial of equal 
protection of the laws under the Constitution; and (3) submitting 
reports to the President and Congress on its fact-finding efforts.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1975a (a), (c) (2006); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440 
(1960).  For the reasons that follow, I argue that the mandate of the 
Commission should not be expanded beyond these traditional civil 
rights obligations to include monitoring of the nation’s compliance 
with international human rights laws.  In the Conclusion, I offer 
several modest suggestions for how the Commission can enhance its 
institutional credibility, better meet its existing duties, and be more 
worthy of the public’s sacred trust. 
 
I.  COMMON GROUND 
To begin, it may be helpful to identify several fundamental points 
on which Professor Crooms and I agree.  First, we agree that a federal 
entity independent of the tripartite branches of the federal 
government should study and assess whether the United States 
upholds its commitments to voluntarily assumed international human 
rights laws.  The extent to which the United States adheres to human 
rights laws demonstrates that it is truly faithful to the rule of law and 
indicates to the broader global community, including moderate and 
fringe elements in the Muslim world, that America upholds certain 
essential values in practice—not just in abstract belief.  See JOSEPH NYE, 
JR., SOFT POWER 55 (2004). 
Second, Professor Crooms and I both recognize that the 
Commission has faced significant criticism for failing to adequately 
fulfill its mandate, with some commentators calling for its closure.  See, 
e.g., LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION FUND, 
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supra, at 4 (“Today, the [C]ommission is so debilitated as to be 
considered moribund.”).  I share Professor Crooms’s belief, however, 
that the Commission’s doors should not be shut.  The factual 
predicate for the Commission’s existence—systemic and entrenched 
civil rights issues, including race discrimination in voting—continues 
to persist and requires serious analysis.  In the 2009 decision Bartlett v. 
Strickland, the Court recognized as much, noting that 
some commentators suggest that racially polarized voting is waning—as 
evidenced by, for example, the election of minority candidates where a 
majority of voters are white.  Still, racial discrimination and racially 
polarized voting are not ancient history.  Much remains to be done to 
ensure that citizens of all races have equal opportunity to share and 
participate in our democratic processes and traditions. 
129 S. Ct. 1231, 1249 (2009).  Thus totally abolishing the 
Commission—thereby leaving Americans without an independent 
arbiter of the government’s civil rights record—is neither sensible nor 
in the best interests of the nation. 
Third, Professor Crooms and I agree that a diversity of 
backgrounds, viewpoints, and perspectives on the Commission is 
necessary for a robust and meaningful evaluation of civil rights in the 
country, both in identifying which problems to address and in 
recommending remedial action with respect to these problems.  An 
absence of diversity limits the credibility of the Commission’s factual 
findings and substantive determinations, whereas its existence may 
enrich the intellectual quality of and provide greater legitimacy to the 
Commission’s work.  Fourth, and relatedly, conscious efforts to 
subvert or bypass rules and policies designed to ensure diversity on 
the Commission only serve to undermine the agency as an institution 
and should be strongly discouraged. 
II.  REFRAMING “CIVIL RIGHTS” AS “HUMAN RIGHTS” 
With this foundation of commonalities in mind, we may now turn 
to where Professor Crooms and I appear to consider things 
differently, despite our other shared beliefs.  As Professor Crooms 
notes, the idea of adding a human rights agenda to the Commission’s 
responsibilities can be traced to an article by Father Theodore M. 
Hesburgh.  See generally Hesburgh, supra.  In the article, Father 
Hesburgh expressed his concern that the hard work of public servants 
in the civil rights arena had been “canceled out by silence.”  Id. at 302.  
To ensure that these civil rights efforts gained appropriate attention 
from the government and the people, Father Hesburgh suggested that 
“civil rights . . . might [better] be faced in terms of human rights.”  Id. 
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at 303 (quoting Implementation of Recommendations of Presidential and 
National Commissions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice 
and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 272 (1971) 
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., 
Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights)).  This statement reveals 
that Father Hesburgh sensed that civil rights matters may attain 
greater traction in the halls of power and in the public square if they 
are reframed as human rights issues. 
Further, Father Hesburgh wrote that the original focus of the 
Commission—racial segregation and similar, overt, race-based 
discrimination—had been “pretty well cleaned up,” however other 
“problems in housing, employment, and schools” and “administration 
of justice problems as they pertain to . . . [minority groups]” remained 
and needed to be addressed by the Commission.  Id. (quoting 
Hearings, supra, at 272 (statement of Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., 
Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights)).  Father Hesburgh 
therefore proposed that the Commission shift its efforts away from 
traditional race-based discrimination to other facets of discrimination 
“such as rights for children or rights for women or rights for old people.”  
Id. at 304 (quoting Hearings, supra, at 272 (statement of Theodore M. 
Hesburgh, C.S.C., Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights)). 
It seems that the full spectrum of civil rights monitoring and its’ 
rebranding of them as human rights issues are what Father Hesburgh 
had in mind for the Commission in his seminal piece.  The force and 
prescient nature of these views, as I interpret them, becomes apparent 
in consideration of the present, post-9/11 context.  Speaking on the 
rights of Muslims after 9/11, Professor Baher Azmy observed that 
there has not been an “appetite in the courts or frankly in the public 
at large for a narrative or discussion about the rights of these 
individuals as individuals.”  Professor Baher Azmy, Remarks at the 
University of Pennsylvania Panel Discussion: Nine Years Later: Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties in Post-9/11 America, (Sept. 28, 2010) 
[hereinafter Panel Discussion].  Because of the sentiment that “‘if 
you’re one of the bad guys, we really don’t want to hear about your 
rights,’” some legal scholars and activists have begun to reframe 
Muslim rights as human rights because “human rights belong to 
everyone” and thus are more identifiable to public officials and the 
people.  Professor Kermit Roosevelt, Panel Discussion, supra. 
In my view, to reframe civil rights as human rights and to 
commensurately reframe the mandate of the Commission to include 
“human rights” as defined in this fashion may not only enhance 
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government and public interest in and support for the Commission’s 
work, but may also adjust public perceptions such that infringements 
of anyone’s rights necessarily may be seen to affect the rights of 
everyone else.  I therefore find quite appealing Father Hesburgh’s 
argument for the Commission’s more comprehensive assumption of 
discrimination issues and for them to be presented in greater society 
as shared human rights’ problems.  In this limited sense, I agree that 
the Commission can be represented as an investigative body with 
human rights functions. 
III.  ADDING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS  
LAWS PROPER TO THE PLATE 
Father Hesburgh’s views on the Commission’s mandate did not, 
however, stop at reframing civil rights as shared human rights.  He 
proposed separately that the Commission’s work include civil rights 
monitoring as well as efforts to ensure the general well-being of 
society—for example by addressing poverty, nutrition, welfare, and 
related social issues.  See BERRY, supra, at 126-28.  The Nixon White 
House rejected this idea.  Id. at 128.  Subsequently, during the Carter 
Administration, a Commission staffer asserted that the Commission’s 
role should be expanded to liaise with human rights entities in other 
countries for the purpose of supplementing President Carter’s 
demonstrated interest in international human rights—an idea that 
also failed to meet with approval.  Id. at 175. 
The latest iteration of this proposal has been expressed most 
notably by Professor Berry, Former Chair of the Commission.  She 
writes that “the [C]ommission could be converted into a human rights 
commission devoted to the idea that all people have a right to be 
treated fairly because of their humanity, as suggested by . . . Father 
Theodore Hesburgh . . . .”  Id. at 337-38.  To the extent this restates 
the “reframing” idea described in Section II, I agree with Professor 
Berry.  She goes on, however, to argue that the Commission “could 
also monitor U.S. compliance with the international human rights 
covenants to which we are a party and encourage adoption of those we 
have not approved.”  Id. at 338.  Expanding human rights proper to 
the Commission’s mandate is imprudent for several reasons: 
Advocates of this expansion enumerate several specific issues that 
a Commission with added human rights duties would be able to 
address.  These include racial disparities in the displacement of 
individuals in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the fatal shooting 
of an unarmed African American by Oakland police officers, and 
allegations of racial injustices in the criminal justice system as 
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exemplified by the “Jena 6.”  These issues implicate questions of 
differential or unjust treatment premised on membership to a 
protected class, and thus seem to be well within the Commission’s 
existing mandate to examine discrimination and related issues in the 
administration of justice.  For Professor Berry and others, the problem 
therefore appears not to be the scope of the Commission’s 
jurisdiction, but how it is exercised or framed for governmental or 
public consumption.  See The Law of the Land: U.S. Implementation of 
Human Rights Treaties: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights & 
the Law and the S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of 
Wade Henderson, President & CEO, The Leadership Conference on 
Civil and Human Rights) (objecting to the fact that the Commission 
has opposed landmark hate crimes and employment discrimination 
legislation, which also seem to fall squarely within the Commission’s 
existing mission). 
If it is the case that the Commission has not done an adequate job 
of addressing problems it is already charged to investigate, it is 
difficult to understand how expanding its mandate can enable, rather 
than complicate, its ability to perform its existing functions.  The Staff 
Director of the Commission from 2004 to 2008, commenting on the 
proposal to saddle the Commission with monitoring international 
human rights obligations, wrote that advocates of this position need to 
explain how “significant additional substantive responsibilities can 
have any effect other than to weaken its current capabilities.”  
Kenneth L. Marcus, Fixing the Civil Rights Commission, ENGAGE, Mar. 
2010, at 12.  We would not give an additional child to a babysitter 
struggling already to safeguard one toddler on the theory that two will 
allow the babysitter to do its job better.  Similarly, we would not add 
lots of hay to an already mighty haystack in order to help a person 
find her needles. 
Sifting through that added hay of international human rights laws 
is not an insignificant responsibility.  It would require the Commission 
to look at, for example, allegations of torture by the administration, 
whether detainees in Afghanistan are entitled to habeas rights, and 
how the detainees in Guantánamo and elsewhere have been treated 
by guards, among other things.  These are weighty questions that 
should not be left with a “debilitated” agency with considerable 
functions at present.  (They perhaps should go, instead, to a new, 
independent federal entity specifically and exclusively established to 
monitor America’s compliance with its international human rights 
obligations.)  Moreover, while civil rights and international human 
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rights laws may be linked at the most general level by concerns for 
human dignity, both are of a distinct nature, are enforced by 
completely different statutes, regulations, and treaties, and implicate 
wholly different sets of parties. 
Civil rights matters in the United States still require the 
comprehensive attention of the Commission because many such issues 
requiring serious study exist today and many will arise in the future.  
See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1249 (2009).  As Professor 
Berry herself concedes, “[g]iven the continued contention and 
resurgence of conflicts over race and other domestic issues . . . it 
might . . . be better to maintain the [C]ommission’s focus on civil 
rights in this country.”  BERRY, supra, at 338. 
Finally, diluting the Commission’s mandate may send the harmful 
message that civil rights matters no longer warrant the existence or 
focus of a dedicated, independent civil rights agency.  Professor Berry 
again puts it best: adding a human rights agenda to the Commission’s 
mandate “might signal a belief that the work that needs doing is done 
or an abandonment of the idea of further progress because the job is 
too difficult and the issues intractable.”  Id.  The very issues that 
advocates of a human rights Commission identify in their 
arguments—such as racial injustices stemming from Hurricane 
Katrina—indicate that civil rights continue to elude our complete 
grasp, meaning that our efforts in this regard must press on unabated 
and undeterred. 
CONCLUSION 
None of my arguments against adding human rights monitoring 
to the Commission’s responsibilities are meant to deny the value of 
and need for human rights compliance efforts.  Rather my arguments 
are intended only to challenge whether the extent to which American 
activities around the world are in lockstep with international human 
rights laws is a question that should be presented to a body already 
charged with examining the state of equality in the fifty states. 
As to improvements to the existing Commission, I believe it would 
be better served by an enlarged budget—which would enable it to 
adequately engage in its civil rights fact-finding—and reauthorization 
from Congress, which would reflect the importance of and continuing 
need for this monitoring agency.  Moreover, actual or perceived 
manipulation of rules designed to ensure true diversity among the 
Commissioners should lead to an exploration of an alternative 
appointments process that will yield a genuinely diverse set of 
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Commissioners and thus enhanced credibility for its vitally significant 
work. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
The Possibilities of More to Overcome the Limitations of Less 
Lisa Crooms 
As Professor Sidhu notes, there are a number of points on which 
we agree.  To those points, I would add the following: 
First, Father Hesburgh’s initial call to expand the Commission’s 
work according to a human rights mandate was accompanied by 
optimism about how quickly civil rights laws would change the terrain 
of race and rights in the United States that time has shown was 
unwarranted.  Second, the racial justice at the center of the 
Commission’s mandate has not been achieved.  Third, more than one 
president rejected Father Hesburgh’s idea to expand the 
Commission’s mandate to include human rights.  Fourth, human 
rights address the general wellbeing of society regarding matters such 
as poverty, nutrition, welfare, and education.  Fifth, in post-9/11 
America, human rights include those issues raised by the “War on 
Terror” that relate to U.S. human rights treaty obligations.  Sixth, 
many of the issues that might benefit from being considered through 
a human rights lens are part of the Commission’s existing mandate.  
Seventh, many of the Commission’s problems stem from not the 
scope of its jurisdiction, but rather from how this jurisdiction is either 
exercised or understood.  Eighth, there is both value in and a need 
for an independent national entity to monitor and assess U.S. 
compliance with human rights law.  Finally, more money, 
congressional reauthorization, a different appointments process, and 
genuinely diverse membership would enhance the Commission’s work 
and credibility. 
Our common ground, however, forms a backdrop that brings our 
points of disagreement into sharp relief.  Whereas Professor Sidhu 
sees the Commission as the poster child for the movement for simple 
living, I share Father Hesburgh’s belief in the possibility of more 
rather than less.  Enlarging “the vision of the American dream beyond 
the purely political rights in national documents of Government . . . 
[to] take in the broader view of the totality of human rights” remains 
the basis on which the government should expand the Commission’s 
mandate.  Hesburgh, supra, at 303-04 (quoting Hearings, supra, at 272).  
Much has changed since Father Hesburgh first linked the 
Commission and human rights—chiefly, the United States has ratified 
human rights treaties that require our government to respect rights 
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such as equality and nondiscrimination and to protect and promote 
these rights domestically.  Just as human rights is the broader context 
in which American civil rights exist, adding human rights treaties to 
the Commission’s jurisdiction merely formalizes the role the 
Commission is expected to play in monitoring domestic laws 
implementing human rights and efforts to enforce them. 
As if anticipating Professor Sidhu’s protestations, Father 
Hesburgh observed that “[s]ome people would object to this and say, 
look, you have enough problems, you should not take on any more, 
but I think, perhaps, sometimes, when you are having trouble getting 
a limited job done, you can even take on a larger job with a larger 
vision.”  Id. at 304 (quoting Hearings, supra, at 273).  Father 
Hesburgh’s vision finds additional support in the fact that an 
understanding of the domestic aspects of human rights law, as well as 
the primacy of enforcement and implementation at the national, 
rather than international level, has become de rigueur.  The Obama 
Administration recognizes that upholding human rights requires 
countries to assess their own domestic laws, policies, and practices.  
The Administration characterizes the United States as “seek[ing] to 
advance human rights and fundamental freedoms around the world, 
[and doing] so cognizant of [its] own commitment to live up to [its] 
ideals at home and to meet [its] international human rights 
obligations.”  U.S. Human Rights Commitments and Pledges, U.S. BUREAU 
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS (Apr. 27, 2009) 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122476.pdf. 
That such a shift of domestic focus on addressing human rights 
seems unwieldy is largely a function of the noninterventionism and 
exceptionalism that have predominated U.S. engagement with the 
international community.  For the United States, participating in the 
United Nations as well as acceding to the principles rooted in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), has always been a 
mixed bag.  More often than not, the United States dickers over treaty 
language and denounces the human rights violations of others while 
neither abiding by the treaty language it helped draft nor permitting 
universal standards to be used to assess its human rights record.  For 
example, the United States helped draft the UDHR which declares 
“[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights[,]” 
but at the same time, the government remained committed to the 
idea that de jure racial segregation was off limits for the emerging 
human rights regime.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. 
Res. 217 (III) A, at art. I, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)(Dec. 10, 1948).  
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This is the same dissonance the United States exhibited in its desire to 
“form a more perfect union” so strong that it yielded a constitutional 
compromise that simultaneously advanced notions of liberty and due 
process of law while protecting property interests and the institution 
of chattel slavery.  Only a civil war and three constitutional 
amendments would begin to address the gaps between the 
Constitution’s soaring rhetoric and the country’s “peculiar 
institution.”  Within fifteen years of the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congress’s authority to enforce its provisions—including 
equal protection of the laws—was limited based on the belief that 
Federal civil rights laws had permitted former slaves to “shake[ ] off 
the inseparable concomitants of that state.”  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
3, 25 (1883).  This permitted the former slave to reach a “stage in the 
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and 
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a 
citizen . . . are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other 
men’s rights are protected.”  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 61.  
Thirteen years later, “equal protection of the laws” and “separate but 
equal” became synonymous.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 
(1896).  Having placed the government’s imprimatur on legally 
mandated racism, states were free to enact legislation designed to keep 
the races separate in the name of protecting the health, safety, and 
welfare of their citizens.  This would remain the case until 1954, when the 
Supreme Court declared that the doctrine of separate but equal was 
unconstitutional.  Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
This change would not have occurred without a multilevel assault 
on Jim Crow that was fueled in part by the notion of human rights as 
expressed in the United Nation’s Declaration of Human Rights.  
Contemporary appeals to embrace human rights are directly linked to 
the history of advocacy of those who saw the United Nations as a 
forum in which the United States might be held to account for the 
“lynching, brutality, terror, humiliation, and degradation through 
segregation and discrimination” that marked the reign of Jim Crow.  
Roy Wilkins, Editorial, Now is not the Time to Be Silent, THE CRISIS, Jan. 
1942, reprinted in THE CRISIS, Nov. 1970, at 331.  By directly petitioning 
the United Nations, these civil rights advocates “captured the 
imagination of African Americans by lifting the struggle of the Negro 
out of the local and national setting and placing it in the realm of the 
international.”  CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE 93 (2003) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  It should be no surprise that 
these petitions were defeated by the maneuverings of U.S. 
representatives determined to keep “the Negro question” out of the 
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United Nations.  Nascent Cold War politics further distorted domestic 
views of human rights, inextricably linking them to a looming 
Communist threat.  Many human rights advocates found themselves 
summoned by the House Committee on Un-American Affairs, 
stripped of their passports and branded as enemies.  This context 
conspired to create a lexicon in which human rights were foreign and 
fundamentally un-American, obscuring the essential Americanness of 
contemporary human rights and the struggle for dignity and equality 
at the root of the United Nation’s human rights mandate. 
Thankfully, the American imprint on human rights law is not lost 
on the current Administration.  By rhetorically breaking with the past, 
President Obama has eschewed exceptionalism, opting to lead by an 
example based on principled engagement.  To this end, his 
administration is committed “to meeting its UN treaty obligations and 
participating in a meaningful dialogue with treaty body members.”  
U.S. Human Rights Commitments and Pledges, supra.  It is also committed 
to cooperate “with the UN’s human rights mechanisms . . . by 
responding to inquiries, engaging in dialogues, and hosting visits.”  Id.  
These commitments evince an understanding of human rights as 
relevant to both domestic and foreign policy.  It is this domestic 
human rights law and policy that would be central to the 
Commission’s work. 
The current Administration also understands that racial justice 
and equality are essential parts of U.S. human rights obligations.  The 
United States has noted its strong commitment “to fighting racism 
and discrimination, and acts of violence committed because of racial 
or ethnic hatred.”  Id.  It has acknowledged that “racism still exists in 
our country and we continue to fight it.”  Id.  These commitments 
demonstrate that adopting a human rights framework need not sound 
the death knell for the continuing struggle against racial injustice.  
Rather, the seemingly intractable questions of race and rights as 
matters of domestic law and policy—by virtue of the United States’s 
ratification of treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racism—involve human rights.  This challenges 
Professor Sidhu’s claim that although “civil rights and international 
human rights laws may be linked at the most general level by concerns 
for human dignity, both are of a distinct nature, are enforced by 
completely different statutes, regulations, and treaties, and implicate 
wholly different sets of parties.”  Rebuttal, supra.  The distinction 
between positive practices based on noninterventionism and 
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exceptionalism, on the one hand, and normative efforts of principled 
engagement informed by the fundamental idea that human rights are 
both universal and interdependent, on the other hand, is challenged 
to clarify the requirement that the standards and norms contained in 
ratified human rights treaties become imbedded in domestic law and 
policy.  Implementation and enforcement of international human 
rights norms will require the United States to pass laws that 
incorporate these standards into domestic law.  The stakeholders 
involved in implementing and enforcing human rights domestically 
are the same stakeholders involved in promulgating and enforcing 
civil rights laws, as well as monitoring those efforts.  This would be the 
human rights work of Father Hesburgh’s U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights and Human Rights.  The Commission’s current responsibility 
to monitor fifty states and the District of Columbia further supports 
expanding its mandate.  Indeed, the conditions under which the 
United States ratifies human rights treaties make both the executing 
laws and the nuts-and-bolts enforcement and implementation of these 
laws at the state and local level matters with which the Commission 
would continue to be concerned, particularly as they relate to racial 
justice and equality.  As the Obama Administration’s human rights 
commitments make clear, the voting rights which Professor Sidhu 
correctly identifies as an essential part of “[t]he factual predicate for 
the Commission’s existence” are also an essential part of the U.S. 
record on human rights.  Id. 
To situate civil rights within human rights is among the first steps 
needed to make good on the Obama Administration’s human rights 
pledges.  To expand the Commission’s mandate is essential to 
building the kind of domestic human rights infrastructure needed to 
meet U.S. treaty-based obligations.  In this type of infrastructure, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms include not only the civil 
and political rights that have been the mainstay of U.S. civil rights 
laws, but also the economic, social, and cultural rights that are far too 
often either left to the vagaries of the market or seen as a matter of 
individual choice and responsibility.  Like Father Hesburgh, I 
advocate for this expansion based on a belief in the possibilities of the 
more of human rights rather than the less of civil rights.  To this end, 
I return to Father Hesburgh’s observations about these possibilities.  
As he noted, “[t]o a large extent, our recommendations represent 
ideas whose times have not yet come. . . . A principal purpose of 
making what some believe are politically unrealistic recommendations 
is to bring these recommendations into the arena of public dialogue, 
with the conviction that this will hasten the time for adoption.”  
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Hesburgh, supra, at 300.  It is in this spirit that I embrace Father 
Hesburgh’s idea about expanding the Commission’s mandate to 
include human rights with the firm belief that it is an idea whose time 
has finally come. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
All Along the Watchtower 
Dawinder S. Sidhu 
The proposal to expand the mandate of the U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights to include monitoring of the nation’s compliance with 
international human rights has been the subject of this Debate.  In my 
Closing Statement, I intend to explain directly and through analogy 
why this proposal remains unpersuasive.  Specifically and at the most 
basic level, it seems to me that advocates of this proposal have failed to 
prove at least four points that appear to be central to their position:  
first, that the state of civil rights is so favorable or tractable as to allow 
the Commission to assume a significantly widened jurisdiction over 
issues outside of the traditional civil rights arena; second, that an 
enlarged mandate will not diminish the Commission’s existing 
capabilities to study civil rights in America; third, that monitoring 
compliance with international human rights obligations is a 
responsibility that must be bestowed on the Commission as opposed to 
another independent federal body; and fourth, that objections to the 
proposal are grounded only in certain rigid ideologies or political 
theories that do not, as an original or threshold matter, believe in the 
importance of American compliance with international human rights 
standards or norms. 
I.  PRELIMINARY COMMENT 
Before addressing the residual contentions about the merits of the 
proposal, I am compelled to respond to Professor Crooms’s view, 
expressed in her final salvo, that I “see[] the Commission as the poster 
child for the movement for simple living.”  This characterization lacks 
any relationship to the truth.  The Commission, as I attempted to 
articulate in my Rebuttal, is charged with performing a vitally 
significant public function:  to ensure that our nation is effectively 
eliminating the specter of discrimination such that an ordered, 
prosperous society comprised of different people may be a viable 
possibility instead of an unattainable, Platonic ideal.  The extent to 
which our nation protects the civil rights of the people is the extent to 
which our nation has fulfilled its promise of liberty for all, and to 
which the people are truly free to pursue opportunities that may lead 
to a better life for themselves, their families, and society at large.  
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Conversely, the nation will not and “cannot endure if [it] falls short 
on the guarantees of liberty, justice, and equality embodied in our 
founding documents.”  Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 348 (1970) 
(Brennan, J., concurring).  Quite plainly, civil rights are fundamental 
and foundational in American society. 
Post-9/11 realities help underscore the importance of civil rights.  
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, Muslims and 
those perceived to be Muslim have been harassed, assaulted, refused 
service in places of public accommodation, fired by their employers, 
and ejected from airplanes, among other things—not because of any 
tie to terrorism, but because of their appearance, which superficially 
links them to those who “look” like terrorists.  See generally DAWINDER 
S. SIDHU & NEHA SINGH GOHIL, CIVIL RIGHTS IN WARTIME:  THE POST-
9/11 SIKH EXPERIENCE (2009); Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by 
Law:  Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 1259, 1259-63 (2004).  Many Muslims and Sikhs were forced to 
stay indoors out of concern for their physical safety, mask their 
religious identity in order to seem less dangerous or suspicious to 
others, broadcast their allegiance to the United States by displaying 
American flags in their cars and outside of their homes, and question 
whether they truly belonged in this American experiment in religious 
freedom.  See, e.g., SIKH COALITION, HATRED IN THE HALLWAYS:  A 
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON BIAS AGAINST SIKH STUDENTS IN NEW YORK 
CITY’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.sikhcoalition.org/ 
advisories/documents/HatredintheHallwaysFinal.pdf (recounting a 
Sikh student’s decision to cut his hair to avoid further harassment); 
Image Archives:  Cover Image from Nov. 5, 2001, THE NEW YORKER, 
http://images.archives.newyorker.com/djvu/Conde%20Nast/New%2
0Yorker/2001_11_05/webimages/page0000001_1.jpg (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2010); Sam McManis, Protective Coloring of Patriotism:  U.S. Flag 
Serves as Armor Against Bigotry, SFGATE.COM (Oct. 06, 2001), 
http://articles.sfgate.com/2001-10-06/news/17623036_1_american-
flag-central-valley-sikh; Kenji Yoshino, Uncovering Muslim Identity, 
TOWARD FREEDOM (Nov. 23, 2005), http://www.towardfreedom.com/ 
home/content/view/674/54. 
As a member of the Sikh community, I assure the reader 
(although I hope it may already be clear) that the civil rights matters 
with which the Commission deals are not about ensuring a “simple 
living” or cushy lifestyle.  Rather, the Commission’s practical objective 
is to make it less likely that targeted groups will be threatened, 
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harassed, intimidated, assaulted, or subject to other illegal, hate-based 
conduct as they go about their daily lives. 
The civil rights of post-9/11 Muslims and Sikhs (and others who 
have been the subject of discrimination) fall squarely within the 
Commission’s existing mandate and are precisely what the 
Commission should be trying to safeguard through its monitoring and 
advisory duties.  The Commission is not a “poster child” or mere 
window-dressing, but is in some respects one of the few bastions of 
hope and relief for those facing persistent discrimination—especially 
for those without the political wherewithal or know-how to effect 
change through other means. 
II.  LESS IS MORE 
Professor Crooms believes in the “possibility of more rather than 
less” for the Commission.  Crooms, Closing Statement, supra.  One may 
be more inclined to agree with Professor Crooms if—and only if—the 
existing mandate of the Commission were not so rife with systemic 
and ongoing societal problems stemming from voting and 
discrimination in other contexts.  The post-9/11 difficulties 
encountered by Muslims and Sikhs—which continue to linger over 
nine years after the attacks—are but one example of the broad, 
national civil rights problems that require the dedicated attention and 
interest of the Commission.  Others include, but are not limited to, 
racial disparities in access to the criminal justice system, racial 
discrimination and disenfranchisement, the equality of educational and 
life opportunities for individuals with emerging disabilities such as post-
traumatic stress disorder, and the rights of immigrants outside of the 
formal legal process.  These examples are just the tip of the iceberg. 
Even if the universe of national civil rights problems were limited 
to the problems just mentioned, the Commission would have its hands 
full:  significant resources and time would be needed to properly 
examine the particular civil rights issues across the nation within these 
broad subjects, and to then propose comprehensive 
recommendations for their remediation. 
The fact remains, however, that the Commission has been unable 
to sufficiently deal with these already weighty national civil rights 
matters.  Were it otherwise, traditional civil rights issues would be 
disappearing from our public squares, boardrooms, and schools.  The 
persistence of these problems suggests that the Commission’s work is 
still necessary and that to dilute its substantive responsibilities would 
be to diminish its abilities relative to traditional civil rights and give 
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license to some of the very issues we wish to banish from our society. 
The operative question, therefore, is not whether to expand the 
fact-finding and advisory functions of the Commission, but how to 
better ensure that the Commission does its existing job more 
effectively for the benefit of the people, including Muslims with 
headscarves, embattled soldiers returning home, or minorities without 
access to counsel or a fair trial, sitting for years on death row. 
In this respect, Father Hesburgh advances a powerful and 
compelling argument.  He posits, in essence, that civil rights are 
human rights and that as a result, any given individual should be 
concerned about the Muslim, the soldier, or the prisoner because her 
rights are my rights.  See generally Thomas Paine, DISSERTATION ON FIRST 
PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT (1795), reprinted in 2 THE POLITICAL AND 
MISCELLANEOUS WORKS OF THOMAS PAINE 17 (R. Carlile ed.) (1819) 
(“[E]very man must finally see the necessity of protecting the rights of 
others as the most effectual security for his own.”).  If, by contrast, we 
see civil rights as particular to a given group and of relevance only if 
the group to which we belong is implicated, civil rights in this nation 
will continue to languish and suffer from indifference, apathy, or 
“silence,” as Father Hesburgh poignantly observed.  Hesburgh, supra 
at 302.  Father Hesburgh’s alternative—that civil rights be reframed as 
human rights—warrants greater exposure and promotion.  If 
anything, this Debate between Professor Crooms and me may be 
considered successful because we both see the value of and need for 
civil rights to be construed as universally held rights.  For the 
Commission’s focus to remain on traditional civil rights and for those 
rights to be reframed as human rights may offer a clearer lens 
through which civil rights may be viewed and may thus trigger a new, 
more effective era of civil rights monitoring and resulting compliance. 
III.  THE FOLLY OF MORE 
If we consider the Commission’s existing jurisdiction—
discrimination and fraud in voting, discrimination generally, and the 
denial of equal protection—as a certain area of law, it is the 
Commission’s duty to monitor and examine societal problems and 
governmental responses in this area.  The Commission is akin to a 
guard at a watchtower, overseeing the social activity and government 
actions in a particular part of the sea.  As is evident by even a cursory 
assessment of the country, and as shown by the examples discussed 
herein, this area contains many entrenched, difficult, and complex 
issues requiring the watchful eye of our conscientious guard. 
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Professor Crooms and others would load additional supervisory 
duties onto this guard, asking her to review the state not only of this 
area (voting disparities and fraud, discrimination, and equal 
protection), but of another vast and complicated area as well—the 
nation’s compliance with international human rights obligations.  
While these areas may blend together at the margins, there can be no 
doubt that they are in fact separate and separable.  In addition to 
monitoring traditional civil rights issues falling within its existing 
jurisdiction, such as discrimination against Muslims, individuals with 
disabilities, or minorities in the criminal justice system, our guard 
would be responsible for assessing, for example, whether 
waterboarding constitutes torture, whether detainees in Abu Ghraib 
or Bagram have been mistreated, whether detainees outside of 
Guantánamo are entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, and whether 
any current or former government officials (such as George W. Bush, 
John Ashcroft, Robert Mueller, and John Yoo) may be held liable for 
their involvement in approving or preparing wartime policies and 
tactics.  Accordingly, placing international human rights compliance 
on the Commission’s shoulders does not, as Professor Crooms claims, 
“merely formalize” an expectation that the Commission look into 
human rights, but instead adds completely different substantive 
responsibilities to the Commission’s demanding and pressing docket. 
In addition to international human rights compliance, Professor 
Crooms would seemingly have the Commission monitor the general 
well-being of everyone in America: 
[H]uman rights and fundamental freedoms include not only the civil 
and political rights which have been the mainstay of U.S. civil rights laws, 
but also the economic, social and cultural rights that are far too often 
either left to the vagaries of the market or seen as a matter of individual 
choice and responsibility. 
For the Commission to examine overall social welfare—such as 
poverty, nutrition, welfare, and related issues—would be for the 
Commission to explore virtually the entire universe of social problems 
and governmental action.  One struggles to find an aspect of 
American life that could not be reasonably tied to economic, social, 
and cultural rights and thus would lie outside the Commission’s 
jurisdiction.  One guard cannot be expected to oversee or survey all, 
as the advocates of the proposal appear to suggest. 
IV.  AN ALTERNATIVE 
The expansive, if not unlimited, jurisdiction proposed by 
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Professor Crooms begs the following question:  why must the 
Commission bear the sole responsibility for monitoring individual 
rights issues?  Professor Crooms cites as “support” for the 
Commission’s expanded role Father Hesburgh’s statement that 
“sometimes, when you are having trouble getting a limited job done, 
you can even take on a larger job with a larger vision.”  Hesburgh, 
supra, at 303-04 (quoting Hearings, supra, at 273).  With due respect to 
Father Hesburgh, this statement amounts to a comment of purely 
aspirational qualities rather than an argument with an evidentiary 
basis.  Professor Crooms further notes that “an understanding of the 
domestic aspects of human rights law, as well as the primacy of 
enforcement and implementation at the national, rather than 
international level, has become de rigueur.”  At the outset of my 
Rebuttal, I endorsed fully the idea that “a federal entity independent 
of the tripartite branches of the federal government should study and 
assess whether the United States upholds its commitments to 
voluntarily assumed international human rights laws.”  It does not 
follow from an appreciation for the relationship between civil rights 
and human rights, or from a recognition that nations themselves 
rather than super-national bodies should engage in enforcement of 
these rights, or from an agreement that human rights proper should 
be examined by an independent federal body, that monitoring the 
nation’s human rights record must fall to the Commission. 
In my Rebuttal, I suggested an alternative paradigm in which 
compliance efforts would be shared.  Specifically, I wrote that the 
international human rights questions might go to “a new, 
independent federal entity specifically and exclusively established to 
monitor America’s compliance with its international human rights 
obligations.”  I proposed a second guard on the watchtower, if you will. 
Professor Crooms’s Closing Statement completely ignores this 
idea and instead appears to insist that the only option with respect to 
international human rights monitoring is to augment the mandate of 
the Commission.  This seemingly all-or-nothing approach lacks 
practical sense and may even be harmful; it compels our guard to take 
on the whole landscape of individual-rights-monitoring and makes it 
more likely that some matters may be overlooked or ignored out of 
sheer administrative strain. 
To obviate the possibility that such monitoring may be stretched 
too thin, we may take a cue from federal agencies that divvy up 
compliance responsibilities among several agencies.  The rights of 
individuals with disabilities, for example, are distributed among 
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several agencies, including the Departments of Justice, Education, and 
Housing and Urban Development.  Even with respect to rights that 
are directly related and not just linked at abstract levels, splitting the 
load makes eminent sense.  That these duties are diffused does not 
indicate that they are any less related or important, or less worthy of 
public or government attention.  Rather, this allocation honors their 
nuanced nature and enhances the agencies’ collective ability to 
address and redress certain individual rights.  By the same token, the 
Commission need and should not be the sole independent entity that 
works to ensure that the nation is meeting its obligations with respect 
to civil rights and human rights proper.  Advocates of the proposal to 
expand the Commission’s mandate appear to be unwilling or unable 
to recognize the merits of the federal agency model. 
Indeed, responsibility is shared not only among the agencies that 
directly promulgate laws and policies with respect to civil rights, but 
among multiple independent federal bodies charged with monitoring 
and recommending solutions to individual rights issues.  For example, 
the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom examines 
whether individuals worldwide may practice their faith free of 
persecution.  International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 22 U.S.C.).  The now-defunct U.S. Commission on Immigration 
Reform studied, among other things, improving family reunification 
efforts, curbing illegal immigration, the impact of immigration on the 
labor market, the provision of educational opportunities to 
immigrants, and national security.  Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.  Clearly, it is possible for multiple 
independent guards to stand watch over the sea of individual rights, 
even if there may be an overlap of jurisdiction. 
The presumption that the Commission is to assume all human 
rights monitoring duties—not just those that may be said to be part of 
its existing mandate—is difficult to square with the sensible and 
prudent sharing of monitoring functions that the federal government 
has practiced.  Put differently, a fixation on a unified procedural 
framework invariably will point to a catchall Commission with broad 
civil rights and human rights monitoring duties, however a focus on 
how to optimally address the rights of the people dictates a more 
workable, shared system. 
CONCLUSION 
My argument is not meant to deny the importance of monitoring 
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our human rights obligations.  In fact, such adherence to 
international human rights laws not only reaffirms our belief in the 
rule of law, but can also generate greater American credibility and 
legitimacy in the world, particularly the Muslim world.  In other 
words, faithfulness to voluntarily assumed human rights standards can 
be an important and positive instrument of foreign policy.  NYE, supra 
at 55.  It cannot be said, therefore, that objections to the proposal to 
expand the Commission’s mandate are grounded in American 
exceptionalism or isolationism.  Proponents of the proposal must 
convince their kin—people in their own tent of political theory and 
those who also seek American fidelity to its human rights 
commitments—of the merits of an expanded Commission.  They 
cannot simply assume that those with objections are on the opposite 
end of the ideological spectrum and reflexively discount these 
objections as a result. 
Ultimately, the question boils down to how, not whether, the 
nation’s compliance with its international human rights obligations 
should be monitored.  I regret that advocates of the proposal now 
under consideration have failed to carry their burden of showing that 
the Commission—tasked already with weighty and complex civil rights 
monitoring responsibilities in a nation that remains racially charged, 
in which there exists great social distance between people of different 
groups, and in which the “us” versus “them” mentality stubbornly 
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